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Abstract
In a recent series of papers Wiseman, Cavalcanti, and Rieffel have outlined and
contrasted two different views about what we now call Bell’s theorem. They
also assert that Bell presented these two different versions at different times.
This view is clearly at odds with the detailed explanation that Bell himself
gave in his later writings. A careful examination of the historic 1964 paper in
context shows clearly that Bell’s own later interpretation is the correct one.
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1 Introduction
Just over 50 years ago Bell wrote the paper[1] in which he derived the following result:
”In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics to
determine the results of individual measurements, without changing the
statistical predictions, there must be a mechanism whereby the setting of
one measurement device can influence the reading of another instrument,
however remote. Moreover, the signal involved must propagate instanta-
neously, so that such a theory could not be Lorentz invariant.”
A half century later, there is still contentious debate about the implications of Bell’s
work.
In an effort to improve communication between two ’camps’ of researchers in
quantum foundations, Wiseman, Cavalcanti, and Rieffel (WCR) have described two
different ways in which Bell’s result can be obtained[2, 3, 4]1. They argue that one
method of derivation is favored by a group that they call ’operationalists’, and the
other by a group labeled as ’realists’. They also make the much more controversial
∗email: gillise@provide.net
1The first paper cited was authored solely by Wiseman, the second by Wisemann and Cavalcanti,
and the third, which was a response to Norsen’s comment[5], was authored by Wiseman and Rieffel.
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historical claim that Bell, himself, presented these two different versions at different
times. In their view, the earlier (1964) paper contains the ”operationalist” version,
and the ”realist” version was not published until 1976[6]. Norsen has written a vigor-
ous dissent[5] from their interpretation of the original (1964) article. Although Norsen
has already made a strong case, the historic importance of Bell’s 1964 contribution
makes it worth presenting some additional evidence for his point of view.
Norsen has called into question the WCR characterization of their favored ver-
sion of Bell’s 1964 argument as ’operationalist’, since the formalization of some key
principles (like ’parameter independence’) that they attribute to that group requires
reference to an an ontology that is rejected by most operationalists. So a more neutral
terminology will be used here. I will refer to the version that they advocate simply
as ’WCR’. The interpretation of the 1964 paper that Bell, himself, presented in his
later writings[6, 7, 8], will be labeled ’JSB’ (Bell’s initials).
Let us begin by outlining the two derivations described by WCR. The background
assumption for both of the derivations is that the quantum statistical predictions
(QSP) are correct. Given this premise there are two ways in which to derive Bell’s
result. One of them is to assume: (a) that the proposed theory (θ) implies that the
setting of one of the measurement instruments does not change the total probability
of the outcomes detected by the other instrument; (b) that the proposed theory is
deterministic. This method reflects the WCR viewpoint. The other (JSB) deriva-
tion assumes that the proposed theory implies that all physical processes2 propagate
continuously through space within the forward light cone. Together with the back-
ground assumption (QSP), this implies the determinism that is assumed in the other
approach.
WCR formalize premise (a) of their interpretation as: Pθ(B|a, b, c, λ) = Pθ(B|b, c, λ),
where P is the function that assigns probabilities to various outcomes, θ is the theory
by which the probabilities are calculated, B represents the outcome of the second
measurement, a and b represent the settings of the first and second measurement
instruments, and c and λ represent all other (possibly hidden) variables that might
be relevant. The authors label this condition as ’locality’ (the term used by Bell
in his 1964 paper), but the meaning of ’locality’ is precisely what is at issue in the
debate over the historical claim about what Bell actually proved in 1964. Shimony[9]
proposed the phrase, ’parameter independence’ (PI). Although that terminology is
also somewhat problematic, it has been widely adopted, and so it will be used here.
Bell discussed the additional assumption in the JSB approach at some length in
a later work[8]. In that work he called the assumption ’local causality’. He used it to
derive the following ’factorizability’ condition on probabilities (in somewhat different
notation): Pθ(A,B|a, b, c, λ) = Pθ(A|a, c, λ)Pθ(B|b, c, λ). Note that this expression is a
close parallel to the formulation of the crucial condition on expectation values that he
used in the 1964 paper. He emphasized that the formal expression should be viewed
2What is to count as a ’physical process’ is to be specified by the proposed theory.
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only as consequence of ’local causality’ - not as a full formulation of it.
Jarrett[10] showed that Bell’s derived condition is logically equivalent to the con-
junction of parameter independence (PI) and an additional constraint that Shimony[9]
later labeled as ’outcome independence’ (OI): Pθ(B|A, a, b, c, λ) = Pθ(B|a, b, c, λ). Jar-
rett’s decomposition helps to distinguish various ways in which a measurement out-
come might be influenced by a distant event, and it also makes it clear that Bell’s
(1990) condition is strictly stronger than PI.
Now, although the formal expression presented by Bell in 1990[8] can be decom-
posed into PI and OI, he regarded ’local causality’ as a single principle (a ”unitary
property” as characterized by WCR[2]). This point is important in the debate about
exactly what conclusion follows from the argument presented in 1964. So it is desir-
able to use a single abbreviation to label this key assumption. Since Bell explicitly
stated that ’local causality’ does not entail determinism, the use of this phrase could
be confusing since he had used the term ’causality’ as a synonym for ’determinism’
in earlier works, including the 1964 article. In 1990 he gave the following informal
statement of the principle:
”The direct causes (and effects) are near by, and even the indirect causes
(and effects) are no further away than are permitted by the velocity of
light.” (Bell 1990)
In what follows, this principle will be characterized as ’No Superluminal Effects’
(NSE), with the understanding that it implies continuous propagation through space.
The principle of determinism (which is not entailed by NSE) will be abbreviated
as ’DET”, and the contradiction that Bell derived in section 4 of his paper will be
indicated as XX.
So the shorthand representations of the two derivations are:
WCR: QSP + PI + DET =⇒ XX ;
JSB: QSP + NSE =⇒ DET ; QSP + NSE + DET =⇒ XX .
Since PI + DET =⇒ NSE, and NSE =⇒ PI, and QSP + NSE =⇒
DET , it is easy to see that the two sets of premises are logically equivalent. So
there does not appear to be any serious dispute about whether Bell’s result could be
derived in different ways. The different derivations of the result can be viewed as
two different theorems. Serious disagreement sets in with the claim that what Bell
actually presented in 1964 was the WCR derivation, and, hence, that both of these
theorems are Bell’s theorems.
I will argue here that the JSB version of the argument is the one that Bell actually
presented in 1964. To understand what Bell was doing in [1] consider the general
structure of his argument. As indicated above, the JSB version has two stages:
(a) QSP + NSE =⇒ DET ;
(b) QSP + NSE + DET =⇒ XX .
The first of these is the central argument of the EPR paper[11] as understood by Bell
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in 1964.3 Bell took the validity of this argument as being both well established and
familiar to his audience. By conjoining the consequence (determinism) of (a) with
the two premises and deriving a contradiction, he was able to show that this version
of the EPR argument is unsound. In other words, either QSP or NSE is false; either
quantum theory is incorrect, or there are real physical effects that are propagated
outside the light cone.
In fact, Bell’s demonstration is a conventional proof by contradiction. (His argu-
ment is contained mainly in section 4, entitled ”Contradiction”.) Consider that in
virtually every proof of this sort the author states the premises, demonstrates the
conflict, and concludes that one of the premises must be false. Immediately after the
passage quoted above in which he states that NSE is inconsistent with QSP, he raises
the possibility that QSP is wrong:
“Moreover, the signal involved must propagate instantaneously, so that
such a theory could not be Lorentz invariant.
Of course, the situation is different if the quantum mechanical predic-
tions are of limited validity.”
Bell’s description of the possible violation of NSE might appear a little loose by
current standards4, but its meaning is clear. The perfect correlations between distant
measurement outcomes described by EPR cannot be explained except by superluminal
effects. The only possibility of avoiding such effects is through the failure of quantum
theory.
The next section will present the case for the JSB interpretation of Bell’s 1964
paper in more detail.
2 What Bell Meant by ’Locality’
The key point in dispute centers on what Bell meant by the term ’locality’. Bell,
himself, stated later quite clearly that the argument presented in his 1964 paper was
the JSB version. In a 1981 essay[7](p. 143)5 he says:
”It is important to note that to the limited degree to which determinism
plays a role in the EPR argument, it is not assumed but inferred. What
3The EPR argument uses the more general premise of no disturbance of one subsystem by a
measurement on the other. The more general premise is, of course, implied by the assumption
of no superluminal action-at-a-distance, and it appears that nearly everyone understood this. For
additional background, the reader is referred to the original article[11], Bohr’s reply to it[12], Fine’s
Stanford Encyclopedia article[13], Einstein’s later writings[14, 15], and the 1957 article by Bohm
and Aharonov[16].
4Since quantum effects do not allow ’signaling’, and some hypothetical superluminal effects are
consistent with Lorentz invariance[17].
5For Bell’s papers that are reprinted in Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechan-
ics, revised edition (2004), all page references here are to that edition.
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is held sacred is the principle of ’local causality’ - or ’no action at a
distance’.”
A few sentences later, in a footnote, he says:
”My own first paper on this subject[*] starts with a summary of the EPR
argument from locality to deterministic hidden variables. But the com-
mentators have almost universally reported that it begins with determin-
istic hidden variables”
In [2] (p.17) Wiseman insists that Bell’s explanation of what he meant was mistaken:
In any case, it seems that once Bell had explicitly defined LC[[i.e., the
JSB notion of locality]], he wished all previous localistic notions he had
used, in particular the notion of locality as per Definition 9[[i.e., ’locality’
= PI]], to be forgotten. Moreover, after a few years he became convinced
that it was the notion of LC that he had in mind all along.”
Since WCR are inclined to discount the explanations that Bell offered later, let
us look at a discussion of ’locality’ given by Bell in a paper that Wiseman very aptly
describes as a prequel6 to ”On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox”. In his pa-
per on hidden variables[18] Bell had shown that the requirements imposed by von
Neumann[19] to rule out the possibility of adding hidden variables to quantum the-
ory were arbitrary and unreasonable. In the last section of the paper he proposed
a requirement that he considered much more natural, and in which he described
the motivation for considering theories of deterministic hidden variables. Near the
beginning of this section entitled ”Locality and separability” he says:
”... there are features which can reasonably be desired in a hidden vari-
able scheme. The hidden variables should surely have some spacial signif-
icance and should evolve in time according to prescribed laws. These are
prejudices, but it is just this possibility of interpolating some (preferably
causal) space-time picture, between preparation of and measurements on
states, that makes the quest for hidden variables interesting to the unso-
phisticated[reference to the Einstein work cited three times in the opening
paragraphs of the subsequent paper ].”
The phrases, ”spacial significance” and ”interpolating some... space-time picture be-
tween”, are clearly meant to convey the idea that ”Locality” (the title of the section)
includes in an essential way the notion that all physical processes propagate continu-
ously through space. The term ”unsophisticated” appears to be an ironic reference to
Einstein and his resistance to the ”orthodox” interpretation promoted by Bohr[12, 20]
and Heisenberg[21, 22].
6The paper on hidden variables was written prior to the EPR paper, but published later.
5
In fact, the final sentence in the quotation can be read as a very brief summary of
the EPR argument. The possibility of maintaining a picture in which physical pro-
cesses propagate continuously within the light cone is what leads ”unsophisticated”
people like Einstein (and Bell himself) to consider a theory of hidden variables, since
without such variables one is forced to accept action-at-a-distance. Note the paren-
thetic phrase, ”preferably causal”. ’Causal’ is being used here, as in the subsequent,
paper as a synonym for ’deterministic’. The qualifier, ”preferably”, indicates that
Bell does not insist on a deterministic account; it is just that it is the only way to
save Einstein locality and still reproduce the perfect correlations discussed by EPR.
It is only after explaining why Einstein’s principle of locality (i.e., no superluminal
effects) requires deterministic hidden variables that Bell goes on to discuss Bohm’s
theory[23], and to characterize it as ”grossly non-local”.
The description in this passage about the continuous propagation of physical pro-
cesses through space with the implied consistency with relativity (given the reference
to Einstein’s views) is a close parallel to Bell’s 1990 description of the principle cited
above:
”The direct causes (and effects) are near by, and even the indirect causes
(and effects) are no further away than are permitted by the velocity of
light.” (Bell 1990)
So prior to the 1964 paper Bell had already described a concept essentially equiv-
alent to what he called ’local causality’ in 1990. Since he had also linked it to fairly
well-known writings of Einstein, it was completely reasonable for him to assume that
the concept would be familiar to his audience. Despite these considerations, WCR
still maintain that this was not the concept that he referred to in [1]. Let us examine
their arguments.
The principal evidence for their claim that Bell defined ’locality’ as
PI, Pθ(B|a, b, c, λ) = Pθ(B|b, c, λ), consists of four passages from [1]. (Some of their
additional arguments will be reviewed later.)
(1) ”It is the requirement of locality, or more precisely that the result of a mea-
surement on one system be unaffected by operations on a distant system with which
it has interacted in the past, that creates the essential difficulty.” (p.14)
(2) ”Now we make the hypothesis[*], and it seems one at least worth consider-
ing, that if the two measurements are made at places remote from one another the
orientation of one magnet does not influence the result obtained with the other.”
(p.14/15)
(3) ”The vital assumption[*] is that the result B for particle 2 does not depend
on the setting a of the magnet for particle 1, nor A on b.” (p.15)
(4) ”In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics to deter-
mine the results of individual measurements, without changing the statistical predic-
tions, there must be a mechanism whereby the setting of one measurement device can
influence the reading of another instrument, however remote.” (p.20)
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Note first that nowhere does Bell use the term, ’define’ or a close equivalent, or
write down any expression that resembles PI. (The phrase in the first passage, ”or
more precisely that...” is used to point out a particular consequence of locality - not
to present a definition.) So the WCR claim is based on their insistence that the
terms, ’(un)affected’, ’influence’, and ’depend’ must be understood as implying that
the total probability of an outcome of a measurement made on one branch of an
entangled system is altered by changes in the setting of the measurement apparatus
that acts on the other branch. This interpretation rests essentially on the fact that,
in all of these passages, Bell refers to the dependence of the outcome of the second
measurement exclusively on the setting of the first instrument, rather than on both
the setting of the instrument and the outcome. In fact, there is a very good reason
that Bell focussed on this particular aspect of the experiment. This is explained
below, but, first, it is important to identify the fundamental interpretive error made
by WCR.
As pointed out in the Introduction, Bell’s factorizability condition is logically
equivalent to the conjunction of PI and OI. For reference these conditions are:
FACT: Pθ(A,B|a, b, c, λ) = Pθ(A|a, c, λ)Pθ(B|b, c, λ).
PI: Pθ(B|a, b, c, λ) = Pθ(B|b, c, λ) (OI): Pθ(B|A, a, b, c, λ) = Pθ(B|a, b, c, λ).
Quantum theory clearly violates factorizability, and therefore, it violates OI. Note that
the negation of either PI or OI would allow a dependence of P (B) on the setting,
a. The only reason that PI appears to imply the independence of P (B) from a is
that PI deals only with the total probability. One cannot claim that the setting of
one measurement apparatus does not ”affect” or ”influence” the outcome of a distant
measurement unless both PI and OI are respected. (This is why the terminology,
’Parameter Independence’, is problematic.) The attempt by WCR to read these very
general terms as applying only to the total probability of the distant outcome is
forced and unnatural. If taken seriously, it would simply rule out the possibility of
explaining the correlations between measurement outcomes, which is the whole point
of the EPR argument.
To make this point in another way, consider that in orthodox quantum mechanics
the outcome of a measurement on one of a pair of entangled systems is influenced by
two factors that are not necessarily connected to anything in the past light cone of that
measurement outcome: (1) the setting of the distant instrument and (2) the outcome
of the distant measurement. Now, ”orthodox” quantum mechanics can be understood
in either of two ways, but this statement holds true in both of them. In the ”von
Neumann” version the wave function, regarded as a genuine physical entity, undergoes
a collapse that spans a spacelike interval. Viewed in this way, the state to which
the wave function collapses (and, hence, the outcome of the second measurement)
is nonlocally influenced by both the setting of the measurement instrument, which
reduces the number of possible resultant states from infinity to two, and the outcome
of the first measurement, which determines which of the two possibilities is realized.
In the operational or ”Bohr-Heisenberg” version there is nothing physical for the
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measurement setting, by itself, to influence. The only meaningful influences are on
experimental outcomes, and these are influenced (nonlocally) by both the setting of
the first instrument and by the outcome of the first measurement. (As Norsen points
out, in the purely operational version it is not even clear that one can formulate
expressions for PI and OI.)
It remains to explain why Bell focuses solely on the setting of the apparatus. The
reason is that it is the one aspect of the experimental arrangements envisioned that
can be placed unambiguously outside the past light cone of the second measurement.
To see this, recall that there were two theories with which Bell was thoroughly familiar
that could reproduce all of the statistical predictions of quantum theory. The first of
these was orthodox quantum mechanics; the other was Bohmian theory[23]. As just
noted, in orthodox quantum mechanics both the measurement setting and outcome
influence the distant result. In Bohm’s theory, however, it is only the setting of
the instrument that can be placed strictly outside the past light cone of the second
measurement. The trajectory of the first particle (and, hence, the deterministic result
of the measurement) is heavily influenced by the previous interaction that generated
the entanglement with the second system, and this interaction is clearly within the
past light cone of the second measurement. So inclusion of possible influences of
the result of the first measurement would have involved a complicated mix of factors
affecting the second outcome and might have detracted from the clarity of Bell’s
result. Thus, it was entirely natural, or even essential, for Bell, in searching for a
clear-cut test to demonstrate the nonlocality of quantum theory, to frame the issue
in terms of the influence exerted by the setting of the first measurement apparatus.
This point can be driven home by considering the closing paragraph of the 1964 paper
in which he describes specific experimental tests.
”Of course, the situation is different if the quantum mechanical predictions
are of limited validity. Conceivably they might apply only to experiments
in which the settings of the instruments are made sufficiently in advance
to allow them to reach some mutual rapport by exchange of signals with
velocity less than or equal to that of light. In that connection, experiments
of the type proposed by Bohm and Aharonov[*], in which the settings are
changed during the flight of the particles, are crucial.”
In further support of this explanation for his choice of phrasing, recall that Bell
was hugely influenced by Bohm’s theory[23]. It was Bohm’s theory (apparently) that
first convinced him that von Neumann’s no-hidden variable theorem[19] was seriously
flawed, and, after recognizing the nonlocal nature of the theory, he had spent a great
deal of effort in trying to construct a version without this problematic feature. It
was largely this effort that led him to his 1964 theorem. With this background, it
is entirely understandable that he emphasized how the setting of one measurement
instrument influences the outcome of the distant measurement, since this is the one
clearly identifiable feature that is not influenced by events in the past light cone of
8
the distant measurement.
So the first three passages cited above should be read, not as a definition of
’locality’, but as a completely unambiguous criterion for ascertaining whether the
principle of locality is violated. The final passage is the statement that any theory
consistent with QSP violates this criterion.
In his comment Norsen[5] has also argued that Bell’s phrasing amounts to stating a
criterion for violating locality, rather than offering a definition. He has made a number
of other compelling points that are worth reviewing here. These concern Bell’s brief
introductory section and the first two paragraphs of his section 2 (Formulation). The
first three passages cited above are all contained in this portion of the paper. As
Norsen points out, in all three of these passages Bell refers to a principle enunciated
by Einstein regarding the issues of locality and separability[15]:
”But on one supposition we should, in my opinion, absolutely hold fast:
the real factual situation of the system S2 is independent of what is done
with the system S1, which is spatially separated from the former.”
These references are indicated by the footnotes ([*]) in the passages. The footnote
for the first passage modifies a use of ’locality’ just prior to the text quoted. In the
third paper[4] Wiseman and Rieffel use the term ”interruption” for these references,
and describe them as appeals to authority. They argue that it would have been
better to omit them in order to ”improve the grammatical and scientific clarity of
the sentence”. But they cannot rewrite Bell’s paper in order to eliminate portions
that conflict with their interpretation of it. Bell referred to the same quotation from
Einstein three times in the first page and a half of his paper, directly qualifying the
three critical passages that have been cited above. Recall from the earlier discussion
that there were additional references to the same passage in the prequel[18] in the final
section entitled ”Locality and separability”. Obviously, Bell was trying to convey to
the reader the critical connotations of his notion of locality.
Norsen also points out that Wiseman’s interpretation of ’locality’ as PI is inconsis-
tent with Bell’s statement at the beginning of the paper that additional (i.e.., hidden)
variables were needed to restore locality to quantum theory. (Maudlin has also made
this point as reported by Wiseman in [2]). PI is a central feature of quantum mechan-
ics; it is what prevents superluminal signaling within the theory. It is very difficult
to believe that Bell was unaware of such a basic property of quantum theory, or that
he thought that Einstein was unaware of it.
To a large extent, the dispute about what Bell proved in 1964 centers on the
adequacy of his recapitulation of the EPR argument in the opening paragraph of his
second section, ”Formulation”. Because it is crucial to the issue at hand it is worth
quoting in full.
“With the example advocated by Bohm and Aharonov[*], the EPR argu-
ment is the following. Consider a pair of spin one-half particles formed
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somehow in the singlet state and moving freely in opposite directions.
Measurements can be made, say by Stern-Gerlach magnets, on selected
components of the spins σ1 and σ2. If measurement of the component
σ1 · a, where a is some unit vector, yields the value +1 then, according
to quantum mechanics, measurement of σ2 · a must yield the value -1 and
vice versa. Now we make the hypothesis[[reference to Einstein quotation]],
and it seems one at least worth considering, that if the two measurements
are made at places remote from one another the orientation of one magnet
does not influence the result obtained with the other. Since we can predict
in advance the result of measuring any chosen component of σ2, by pre-
viously measuring the same component of σ1, it follows that the result of
any such measurement must actually be predetermined. Since the initial
quantum mechanical wave function does not determine the result of an
individual measurement, this predetermination implies the possibility of
a more complete specification of the state.”
The general form of the argument has already been briefly summarized above.
Given the statistical predictions of quantum theory, there are systems with physical
quantities that are not determined by the theory, but which can be precisely as-
certained by making measurements on entangled partner systems that are spacelike
separated. If we assume that there is no action-at-a-distance then these quantities
must be determined by events in the common past of both systems. Since quantum
theory does not provide specific values for all of these quantities it is incomplete. (A
complete theory would yield values for all such quantities, and would, therefore, be
deterministic.)
For the reasons given above WCR insist that Bell is not using Einstein’s notion
of locality here (no action-at-a-distance), but rather the much weaker assumption of
parameter independence. Therefore, they conclude that Bell is mistaken in assuming
that determinism follows from the stated premises. In other words, despite the fact
that he states that he is summarizing the EPR argument, Bell, without fully realizing
it, substitutes a weaker premise for Einstein’s concept of locality, and then, without
fully realizing it, makes an assumption of determinism rather than simply restating
an established result.
Without a truly compelling reason for accepting the WCR interpretation of ’lo-
cality’, their reading of this paragraph appears exceptionally strained and artificial.
We have already seen that the argument for that interpretation evaporates on closer
examination, and also that Bell had previously used the term ’locality’ as essentially
synonymous with Einstein’s principle of no action-at-a-distance. But, since Norsen
has also stated that this very brief discussion could benefit from a more general de-
scription of ’locality’, it will be helpful to view Bell’s short summary of EPR against
the most relevant background.
As Bell states, he was working from the version of the EPR ”paradox” that had
been presented by Bohm and Aharonov[16] in 1957 (only seven years before his paper).
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The closing paragraphs of their introductory section summarize the EPR argument
and apply it to their proposed experimental arrangement. This straightforward ex-
position should make it clear why Bell did not feel compelled to repeat it at greater
length.
”One could perhaps suppose that there is some hidden interaction between
B and A, or between B and the measuring apparatus, [[which measures
A]] which explains the above behavior. Such an interaction would, at the
very least, be outside the scope of current quantum theory. Moreover, it
would have to be instantaneous, because the orientation of the measuring
apparatus could very quickly be changed, and the spin of B would have
to respond immediately to the change. Such an immediate interaction
between distant systems would not in general be consistent with the theory
of relativity.
This result constitutes the essence of the paradox of Einstein, Rosen,
and Podolsky.”
This passage clearly describes the apparent conflict between the predictions of
quantum theory and the principle of no action-at-a-distance. It also makes obvious
the concern that violations of this principle would occur if the setting of one of the
measurement instruments (which could be changed while the entangled particles were
in flight) affected the distant measurement.
We can now turn to the other arguments offered by WCR (summarized on page
10 of [2] and repeated in [4]). In reference to the interpretation just offered Wiseman
says:
”To me, the advantages of this reading are demonstrably outweighed by
its many disadvantages: i) it does not explain why Bell would, in 1964,
state his result four times as requiring two assumptions, locality and de-
terminism, and not once as requiring only the assumption of locality; ii)
it does not explain why in his first subsequent paper on the topic of hid-
den variables [*], after seven years to think about how best to explain his
result, he still states it (somewhat redundantly) as being that no local
deterministic hidden-variable theory can reproduce all the experimental
predictions of quantum mechanics [*]; iii) it does not explain why Bell
would, in 1964, define locality four times in terms of independence from
the remote setting, as per Definition 9, and never any other way; iv) it
does not explain why Bell would state the conclusion of the supposedly
crucial first part of his theorem as being merely that it implies the possi-
bility of a more complete specification of the state.; v) it does not explain
why Bell would place this supposedly crucial first part prior to the math-
ematical formulation of his result, and not mention it anywhere else in
the paper.”
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The third point has been dealt with extensively above. Let us consider point (i).
The four passages that Wiseman is referring to are:
”In this note that idea [[causality and locality]] will be formulated math-
ematically, and shown to be incompatible with the statistical predictions
of quantum mechanics.” (p.14)
”This is characteristic, according to the result to be proved here, of any
such theory [[like Bohm’s hidden variable theory]] which reproduces ex-
actly the quantum mechanical predictions.” (p.14)
”the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics are incompatible with
separable predetermination.”(p.20)
“In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics to
determine the results of individual measurements, without changing the
statistical predictions, there must be a mechanism whereby the setting of
one measurement device can influence the reading of another instrument,
however remote. ” (p.20)
The first of these passages is the third sentence of ”On the Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen paradox”. The two opening sentences that precede it are:
”The paradox of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen[*] was advanced as an
argument that quantum mechanics could not be a complete theory but
should be supplemented by additional variables. These additional vari-
ables were to restore to the theory causality and locality[reference to Ein-
stein’s 1949 passage].”
Again, Bell is taking the EPR argument as an established result. That argument pro-
ceeded from the no-disturbance assumption implied by Einstein locality (NSE), and
the limited set of quantum predictions that involve perfect correlations between out-
comes of spacelike-separated entangled systems. It concluded that a hidden-variable
(deterministic) theory was required. Locality (i.e., Einstein locality) and causality
(i.e., determinism) are premises of Bell’s argument; WCR fail to distinguish between
premises and assumptions. The first of these premises, Einstein locality, is an as-
sumption, but the second, determinism, is a property that follows from (Einstein)
locality and the other assumptions of the EPR argument. This point can be equally
well applied to the other three passages mentioned.
The same answer can be directed to point (ii). But, in addition, the paper cited[24]
includes statements that clearly run counter to the interpretation that WCR try to
construct. In again briefly summarizing the EPR argument, Bell (p. 31) talks about
filling out quantum theory in a way that would be ”manifestly local”. But in the
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view advocated by WCR, quantum theory is already ”manifestly local” since PI is
one of the basic properties of standard quantum theory.
The fourth point, referring to Bell’s brief recapitulation of the EPR argument in
the opening paragraph of Section 2, is based on the failure to see that the conclusion
of Bell’s EPR description consists of two sentences - not just one. In the penultimate
sentence Bell states very clearly that the need for a deterministic theory ”follows”
from the assumptions of no action-at-a-distance and the perfect correlations predicted
by quantum theory in the type of experiment that he discusses. In the final sentence
he notes the EPR conclusion that such a theory would involve a more complete
specification of the state. The inference to determinism is an essential premise of
Bell’s argument. Bell closes this recapitulation by describing the hope of ’completing’
the theory in a manner that allows one to save Einstein locality because this is what
his subsequent demonstration will show to be impossible.
Point v) reflects the insistence by WCR that in order to use the inference of
the EPR argument from (Einstein) locality to determinism, Bell would have needed
to present an explicit logical formalization of the the argument, rather than simply
assume that his audience was familiar with it. This insistence simply ignores the
context in which Bell was writing. The EPR argument had come to be widely known
as the EPR ”paradox”. The term, ’paradox’, was used both by Bell and by Bohm-
Aharonov in the titles of their papers. The argument was seen as a paradox because
of the obvious clash between the principle of no superluminal action-at-a-distance
(which was regarded as essential to relativity), and the perfect correlations between
spacelike-separated measurement results that quantum theory predicted, but could
not explain. Given this very widespread understanding, it was entirely reasonable for
Bell to proceed based on a brief, informal recapitulation of EPR.
3 Summary
Wiseman, Cavalcanti, and Rieffel deal with a number of issues in the debate between
the groups that they characterize as ’operationalists’ and ’realists’, and, in particular,
the various meanings that can be attached to the term ’locality’. These issues are
well worth exploring, but the only question that is being addressed in this comment
concerns what Bell demonstrated in his 1964 paper.
The JSB interpretation of Bell’s argument was outlined in the introduction:
(a) (EPR argument) QSP + NSE =⇒ DET ;
(b) (Bell’s argument based on EPR) QSP + NSE + DET =⇒ XX .
The WCR version of Bell’s argument was represented as:
(b’) QSP + PI + DET =⇒ XX .
Since (a), the EPR argument, was regarded as an established result, Bell did not
attempt to formalize it. What was ”formulated mathematically” was a consequence of
the conjunction of the premises of (b) or (b’). Since the conjunctions of the premises
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of (b) and (b’) are (essentially) logically equivalent, this does not tell us whether Bell’s
use of the term ’locality’ should be formalized as parameter independence or as no
(superluminal) action-at-a-distance. The fact that determinism (DET) is used as a
premise in both versions fully explains why Bell refers to it in stating his conclusion.
So the reference to it cannot be used in support of the WCR interpretation. In fact, as
Norsen has pointed out, the fact that the paper is entitled ”On the Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen paradox” argues strongly that Bell was taking determinism as a consequence
of the EPR argument - not as an independent assumption.
So the case for interpreting ’locality’ as parameter independence turns entirely on
an unreasonably restrictive interpretation of terms like ”affect” and ”influence”, and
on the fact that Bell limited his discussion of possible nonlocal effects to potential
influences by the setting of a measurement instrument on a distant measurement out-
come. The insistence that nonlocal effects must take into account both the setting
of an instrument and the result of the measurement made with that instrument ap-
pears to result from a failure to see that standard quantum theory was not the only
theory considered by Bell that was capable of reproducing the quantum statistical
predictions. In Bohm’s theory, which Bell had studied in great depth, the result of a
measurement depends on a combination of factors, some of which are inside the past
light cone of the distant measurement, and some of which are outside. The only event
that can be placed clearly outside the past light cone is the setting of the instrument.7
So there is no real basis for the WCR interpretation of ’locality’. In contrast, the
case for reading ’locality’ as no action-at-distance is very strong. Bell’s opening re-
marks that an extension of quantum theory would ”restore to the theory ...locality”,
make perfect sense, as does his recapitulation of the EPR argument (particularly
against the background of the Bohm-Aharonov discussion). One does not need to
argue away the three references to Einstein’s 1949 passage that qualify his discus-
sions of locality. His prior use of the term, ’locality’, (which was consistent with
the contemporary understanding) carried the clear connotation of continuous, sublu-
minal propagation through space. Finally, we should consider the manner in which
Bell concluded his analysis of the EPR argument - by emphasizing the violation of
Einstein locality.
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